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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the performance of 515 banks in 16 transition economies for the 
years 1994 – 99 based on their public financial accounts. We first examine lending 
behaviour and probability distribution of bank profitability to determine whether these 
banks exhibit behaviour and performance associated with excessive risk-taking. While 
we do not find evidence of excessive risk taking on average where there is significant 
progress in banking and related enterprise reforms, there may be a minority of poorly 
capitalised banks that do take excessive risks, particularly where progress in reform is 
less advanced. The paper then estimates cost and revenue functions based on a model of 
banks as multi-product firms. The results indicate that banks' performance differs 
significantly depending on the reform environment, as well as the competitive conditions, 
in which they operate. Banks with high market shares have higher costs and achieve 
lower margins on their loan and deposit activities. Where there has been significant 
progress in banking and related enterprise reforms, banks are making comfortable 
margins on loans and appear to be offering competitive margins on deposits, though they 
are still achieving overall negative returns on equity.  By contrast, when substantial 
reforms have not been undertaken, banks have been sustaining high negative returns on 
loans, largely at the expense of depositors; in effect they have been able to appropriate 
much of the tax that inflation levies on nominal deposits, and have been using this 
revenue to prop up their weak loan portfolios. Overall interest margins are declining over 
time but are substantially higher in low reform environments. The results indicate that an 
appropriate policy and regulatory framework may be a necessary condition for significant 
progress to be made. 
 
JEL codes: G2, L1, L8, P2 
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1. Introduction1 
 
This paper analyses the performance of banks in a sample of transition economies, using 
a novel econometric approach to modelling banks as multi-product firms. This approach 
is aimed at understanding why successful banking system reform is taking so long in 
transition economies. The development of a financially sound, market-oriented banking 
system is often thought to be fundamental to a successful transition. Arguably, it is vital 
both to macroeconomic stability and to favourable long-term growth prospects. Yet, as 
Berglöf & Bolton (2001) and Fries & Taci (2001) have documented, bank intermediation 
in transition economies remains stunted after a decade or more of reform, particularly 
where progress in banking reforms is limited. The profitability of the banking system also 
remains unimpressive, once the effect of inflation on real profitability is taken into 
account. The ratio of net profit before taxes to total assets has averaged about 1.2 % in 
the large sample of banks from transition economies, which is the focus of this paper. 
This figure appears to compare favourably with the typical performance of banks in the 
OECD where returns averaged about 0.7 % of total assets, in the period 1993 to 1995.  
However, when the effect of inflation on the real value of bank equity is taken into 
account, we find that returns in transition economies dwindle to a mere 0.02 %. This 
paper attempts to shed some light on the developments achieved by banks in transition 
and their performance (or lack thereof). 
 
The weak performance of banks in transition economies is in many ways unsurprising. 
Like industrial firms, socialist banks were themselves enterprises that were often badly in 
need of restructuring at the outset of transition. Until then, banks had been used mainly to 
channel funds, providing credits to state enterprises for investment projects approved 
under central planning. The allocation of finance was not determined by the opportunity 
                                                           
1 The valuable research assistance of Nadia Aleshina, Andrij Halushka, Charles Ng and 
Colin Rowat is gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful to Erik Berglof, Wendy 
Carlin, Christa Hainz, Mark Schaffer and Claudia Senik-Leygonie for very helpful 
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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cost of funds and the expected ability to repay; or at least, if such considerations ever 
influenced investment decisions, it was at the planning level and not at the level of the 
banking system. As a consequence, banks have had to restructure their own activities and 
learn from scratch much of the trade of their counterparts in market economies.  
 
Particular features of the banking industry also make restructuring particularly hard to 
achieve. The conditions that are most conducive to the restructuring of industrial 
enterprises (difficult as this is) are effective competition in the product market, effective 
mechanisms of corporate control and the imposition of hard budget constraints (see, for 
example, Carlin, Fries, Schaffer and Seabright (2001)). But these are even less likely to 
obtain in the case of banks than of most ordinary firms. Consider product market 
competition. When commercial and central banking functions were separated early in the 
transition, the “monobank” inherited from central planning was almost invariably split 
into a very small number of independent entities. Moreover, the process of entry into the 
banking sector was often poorly regulated, with many newly established private banks 
lacking the necessary capital and skills to compete effectively with the dominant state-
owned and privatised banks.  
 
It is with hard budget constraints, however, that the main difficulty arises.  Given that 
banks are prone to runs and that bank failures can precipitate a financial crisis, banks 
almost invariably benefit from some form of state guarantee (either through an implicit 
bailout commitment by the central bank or explicit deposit insurance).  A simple hard 
budget constraint is not appropriate for banks even in mature market economies, so it is 
likely that bank restructuring will be even more difficult in transition than the 
restructuring of enterprises for which uncompromising bankruptcy rules make more 
sense.  
 
In this paper, we consider a sample of 515 banks from 16 countries over the years 1994–
99. Of the total number of banks, 10 are in Belarus, 26 in Bulgaria, 45 in Croatia, 30 in 
the Czech Republic, 14 in Estonia, 12 in the FYR Macedonia, 36 in Hungary, 22 in 
Kazakhstan, 28 in Latvia, 13 in Lithuania, 52 in Poland, 29 in Romania, 118 in Russia, 21 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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in the Slovak Republic, 29 in Slovenia, and 30 in Ukraine. The data for individual banks 
are annual and they include information from income statements and balance sheets and 
on bank ownership. The banks covered in this study account for the vast majority of 
banking operations in their respective countries. 
 
The primary source of data on the banks’ balance sheets, income statements and 
ownership is the BankScope database produced by the Bureau van Dijk, which includes 
data on 10,227 banks world-wide. The database is updated monthly and latest issue of the 
BankScope database used in this study was March 2001. The BankScope data were 
supplemented with the data and information from annual reports of the banks and from 
EBRD staff research on bank ownership. The central banks of the countries provided 
aggregate data on their banking systems for use in calculating market shares in deposit 
taking and lending activities. The sources of the macroeconomic data on the relevant 
countries were the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
 
We estimate an econometric model both of bank revenues (adjusted for inflation) and a 
standard cost function. The revenue function identifies banks’ return on equity and the 
source of bank revenues – in particular the relative profitability of loan-making and 
deposit-taking activity - and allows us to investigate a number of determinants of firms 
margins, including corporate control variables and measures of market power. The cost 
function captures variation in productive efficiency across banks and over time.  
 
One concern with evaluating performance on the basis of banks’ accounts, however, is 
that accounting profits may not accurately reflect economic profits, particularly regarding 
the risk of bank assets and their valuation. This is partly because of variations in 
accounting conventions across countries, though the fixed effects methodology we 
employ in this paper is intended to minimise distortions arising from this source as far as 
reasonably possible. More worryingly, current accounting profits may well come at the 
expense of future profits when banks engage in excessive risk taking. Before undertaking 
the econometric investigation we therefore consider in section 2 the extent to which 
banks may have taken excessive risks by examining the lending behaviour and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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profitability of banks in different reform environments. While we do not find evidence of 
excessive risk taking where there is significant progress in banking and related enterprise 
reforms, there may be a minority of poorly capitalised banks that do take excessive risks, 
particularly where there is inadequate institutional development.  
 
Our econometric findings in section 3 indicate that banks' performance differs 
significantly depending on the environment in which they operate. Where there has been 
significant progress in banking and related enterprise reforms in the areas of bankruptcy 
and corporate governance, new entrants have had significantly lower costs, as have firms 
in more competitive markets. Banks in a favourable reform environment also obtain low 
margins on deposits and relatively high margins on loans, though they have nevertheless 
been achieving overall negative returns on equity.  By contrast, when substantial banking 
and enterprise reforms have not been undertaken, new entrants have been unable to 
achieve significant cost savings. Average returns on loans have also been strongly 
negative. Although returns on equity are unimpressive, it is principally depositors rather 
than shareholders who have been bearing the cost, since they have been receiving very 
poor real returns to their savings. The outlook is not entirely bleak – returns on loans at 
the margin, for instance, are greater than average returns, indicating that banks which 
have managed to grow their loan portfolio over time have been doing substantially better 
than others. Nevertheless, the overall record is poor: in these low reform environments, 
much of the tax that inflation levies on nominal deposits has simply disappeared down 
the drain of poor bank loan management and cost control.  
 
Our econometric work uses accounting data, so we begin to considering one of the most 
important objections to the use of such data for drawing conclusions about bank 
performance. 
   
 
2.   Excessive risk taking? 
 
In general, what provides banks with an incentive not to take excessive risk is the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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prospect that in case of failure they will lose the rents they obtain from operating as 
financial intermediaries and the capital that they already have. These rents typically arise 
from institutional barriers to entry, such as banking licences, which are valuable assets 
that established banks will seek to protect. The capital is either paid in by shareholders or 
accumulated from profits after taxes and dividends. From the point of view of the 
managers of a bank, therefore, risk taking above normal prudent levels has two opposite 
consequences. On the one hand, it enhances the expected profits of the bank and its 
shareholders at the expense of the implicit or explicit insurance mechanism. On the other 
hand, it enhances the probability of losing the banking licence. It is intuitively clear that 
when the value of the banking licence is small, the first effect will dominate the second. 
When it is large, banks will seek to protect it by reducing risk taking.   
 
Faced with sudden difficulties, the optimal strategy of banks will differ according to their 
value of their licence (see Marcus (1984)). If it exceeds some threshold value, banks will 
attempt to re-capitalise. This will reduce the probability of failure and protect the licence. 
But if the value of the licence lies below the threshold, banks will reduce their capital 
base thereby attempting to extract the most from the insurance mechanism. This strategy 
is often referred to as “gambling for resurrection”. In addition to the value of the banking 
license, the value of the threshold also depends on the initial capital base of the 
institution. The stronger the capital base and the larger is the value of the banking licence, 
the lower is the probability that banks will gamble for resurrection. Faced with a common 
negative shock, the population of banks will divide into two groups.  Banks with a strong 
capital base and/or a valuable banking licence may decide to strengthen their capital base 
while others decide to gamble. This choice can also be constrained by banking regulation 
and supervision, depending in part on the extent of institutional development.  
 
The circumstances of transition economies are also potentially favourable to the 
emergence of excessive risk taking.  First, the initial shock associated with the 
liberalisation of prices that had affected the underlying value of bank assets was both 
large and unpredictable. It has proved difficult to judge the appropriate degree of re-
capitalisation, which has taken place in all countries (albeit in different ways), and it is William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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unclear whether the improvement in the capital base was always sufficient to avoid 
incentives for excessive risk taking. Second, at least some banks have been affected by 
severe additional shocks. To the extent that lack of progress in enterprise reform to 
complement the privatisation of large-scale enterprises that has been observed in at least 
some countries was not anticipated, the value of the banks’ assets has been further 
undermined.  These subsequent shocks may have triggered excessive risk-taking for some 
banks. Casual evidence of bank failures as late as 1997 in Hungary, not to mention the 
Russian banking crisis of 1998, certainly confirm that the situation of some banks has 
remained precarious well into the process of transition. 
 
Whether a particular bank does engage in “gambling for resurrection” can in principle be 
inferred from its lending policy and the evolution of its capital base. The total volume of 
loans should grow with a shift towards more speculative assets, the proportion of problem 
loans should increase, provisions should fall and the capital base should shrink. There is 
indeed some ex post evidence suggesting that relatively high loan growth is a significant 
leading indicator of banking crises (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)).  In 
terms of profitability, one would expect that, on average, returns will also fall (indeed, if 
they do not, the strategy is no longer an instance of socially undesirable moral hazard). 
However, returns may not fall immediately: it is quite possible for “gambling for 
resurrection” to involve high present returns at the expense of a deterioration in the 
quality of the loan portfolio that translates into lower profitability only in future years. 
All of these variables can in principle be observed, but it is hard to establish a proper 
benchmark against which their evolution can be assessed.  For instance, it may be 
difficult to decide at what stage a particular rate of loan growth can be considered 
excessive.  
 
Hence, rather than considering individual banks, we rather try to detect the presence of 
gambling for resurrection from the behaviour and performance of the population of 
banks. In particular, we will examine whether the population of banks divides in separate 
groups with different lending behaviour and profitability performance. The benchmark 
against which the loan policy and profitability of gambling banks is assessed in this William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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approach is thus the behaviour and performance observed for an alternative set of banks. 
Importantly, this approach assumes that there are banks that do pursue a policy prudent 
lending and re-capitalisation. We assume that this behaviour is more likely to be observed 
where the institutional framework for banking and bank lending to private borrowers is 
more developed. It appeals to the theoretical arguments for a threshold value of bank 
capital that divides the population of banks into two distinct groups pursuing different 
strategies and that bank capital requirements are more likely to constrain effectively 
lending decisions where the institutional framework is relatively well developed. 
 
In what follows, we consider two measures of bank behaviour and performance. First, we 
examine whether loan growth is positively or negatively associated with the capital base 
of banks. A positive association between these variables across banks would be 
consistent with prudent lending on the basis of adequate bank capital and favourable 
profitability dynamics, given the negative relation between bank capital and the incentive 
to “gamble for resurrection”. A zero or negative association would suggest that low levels 
of bank capital do not constrain banking lending, which points to the presence of 
“gambling for resurrection”, at least by those banks with low levels of bank capital and 
high real loan growth. Second, we consider the distribution of returns across banks and 
attempt to detect differences in the overall balance between expected returns and risks 
and in their evolution over time. This includes the possible emergence over time of a bi-
modal distribution of profitability that would be characteristic of population of banks that 
is separating into two groups of “gambling” and “sound” banks. 
 
We examine each measure for two samples of banks. One sample includes observations 
for banks in those countries and years in which a “high” reform state is achieved.  This 
state is defined using indices compiled by the EBRD for both banking reform and related 
enterprise reforms in the areas of bankruptcy and corporate governance. A high reform 
state is characterised by a country having achieved an index score in the top half of the 
scale for both banking and enterprise reforms. The other sample includes observations for 
banks in those countries and years in which only a “low” reform state is achieved 
(defined as not the high state). This partitioning of the entire sample results in two William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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broadly equal sub-samples in terms of numbers of observations.  
 
In order to investigate the association between loan policy and the quality of balance 
sheets, Charts 1 and 2 plots loan growth (adjusted for inflation) against the ratio of equity 
to total assets lagged one year. The charts show the association between real growth in 
outstanding loans and capital-asset ratios for the “high” and “low” reform states, 
respectively. A fitted non-linear regression curve suggests that high rates of loan growth 
are associated with high ratios of equity to total assets in the high-reform state and that 
there is no significant association between loan growth and bank capital in the low-
reform state. In fact, in a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of real loan 
growth for similar samples of banks, Fries and Taci (2001) find a statistically significant 
and positive association between loan growth and bank capitalisation in the high-reform 
state, but no such relationship in the low-reform state. This result suggests that low levels 
of bank capital tend to constrain the real expansion of loans where banking and related 
institutions are more developed, but that there may be a greater incidence of “gambling 
for resurrection” in the low reform state by banks with low capital-asset ratios. 
 
Chart 1: Real loan growth versus bank capital in high reform states 
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Chart 2: Real loan growth versus bank capital in low reform states 
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We use a standard non-parametric procedure (essentially a smoothed histogram) to plot 
the density of profits adjusted for inflation expressed as a per cent of total assets. Chart 3 
shows the density functions for the samples of banks in the high- and low-reform states. 
The modal value for the inflation-adjusted rate of return on assets in the high-reform state 
is above that in the low-reform state (0.62 % versus 0.40 %) and the dispersion of the 
distribution in the low-reform state is clearly greater than that in the high-reform state. 
The variance of the profitability distribution in low-reform state exceeds by a factor of 3 
that of the profitability distribution in the high-reform state. This result suggests that 
banks in the low-reform state take on greater risks than do those in the high-reform state, 
which is consistent with the evidence on real loan growth relative to bank capital pointing 
to greater risking by banks in the low-reform state. 
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Chart 3: Density functions for bank profitability in high and low reform states 
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Charts 4 and 5 show the evolution of the profitability densities over time in the high-
reform and low-reform states, respectively. In the high-reform state, the modal point of 
the density function shifts over time, but the dispersion of the distribution remains 
relatively stable, except for 1998. In this year, the distribution has a relatively fat lower 
tail, with a significant number of loss-making banks in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
In the low-reform state, the modal point of the density functions shifts over time, but the 
dispersion again remains relatively stable except for 1998 and 1999. In 1998, the 
distribution has a relatively fat lower tail and in 1999 it has relatively slim tails. This 
reflects the significant losses incurred by Russian, Latvian and Ukrainian and banks in 
1998 in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis and the significant reduction in 
number of loss-making banks in the sample in 1999. However, there is no direct evidence 
of the emergence of a bi-modal distribution of bank profitability in either the high- or 
low-reform state. The absence of a bi-modal distribution is still consistent with the 
possibility that a minority of banks is engaging in excessive risk taking in pursuit of 
short-term profits.   
Kernel Density Estimate. 1995-99 
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Chart 4: Density function for bank profitability in high reform states by year 
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Chart  5: Density function for bank profitability in low reform states by year 
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There are several reasons, however, for interpreting this evidence with caution. First, as 
with the accounting valuation of loans, the ratio of equity to total assets is a lagging 
indicator of a bank’s financial strength. The accounting measure of equity can overstate 
the true strength of a bank when non-performing loans have not been classified and 
provisioned against. Nevertheless, measured equity is somewhat less sensitive to mis-
reporting than loan values are because it includes the equity contributions of shareholders 
as well as the cumulation of past reported profits and losses. Second, the results indicate 
the presence of a substantial minority of banks whose loan portfolios are growing on an 
inadequate foundation of shareholder equity. The behaviour of this minority of banks can 
give cause for concern even if it is not characteristic of the sample as a whole. Third, 
banks can engage in forms of risk taking other than rapid loan growth. The Russian 
banking crisis noted above arose not only from a proliferation of non-performing loans, 
but also from large open foreign exchange positions assumed through off-balance sheet 
transactions.    
 
We now turn to our main empirical analysis, namely the estimation of revenue and cost 
functions for individual banks. 
 
 
3.  An econometric model of banks’ revenues and costs     
 
In this section, we derive a simple econometric model, which can shed some light on the 
productive efficiency and the source of revenues for banks. Following Freixas and 
Rochet (1998), we recognise that banks manage both their liabilities, by attracting 
deposits, and their assets by providing loans and investing into securities, with the 
constraint that total assets should be equal to total liabilities, including their own equity 
capital. As far as we are aware, this is the first time such an approach to the multi-product 
nature of banking has been implemented econometrically2. To the extent that the total 
volume of deposits obtained from non-financial institutions does not match the volume of 
                                                           
2 This approach also avoids fruitless debates about whether deposits are an input to the production of loans 
or loans an input to the production of deposits. Banks produce both deposits and loans, subject to a balance 
sheet constraint linking the quantity of one to the quantity of the other. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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their loans, banks also have the opportunity of borrowing, or lending, in the inter-bank 
market. 
 
The profit function of a representative bank then includes the returns it obtains from 
lending activities, the returns it obtains from non-loan assets, the interest it pays on 
deposits, the interest cost of its net position on the inter-bank market, as well as the 
(management) cost of undertaking its activities.  Let Di, Li and Ni denote deposits, loans 
and securities investment of a representative bank i, C(Di, Li, Ni, Wi) refer to management 
costs (Wi, is a set of factor prices), R be the inter-bank rate, and r
l , r
d and r
n respectively 
be the interest obtained on loans, the interest paid on deposit and the return obtained from 
non-loan assets.  Finally, Ei is the equity capital of the bank. The profit function can then 
be written as:  
 
  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i
n
i i
d
i i
l
i i W L N D C D E N L R N r D r L r , , , − − − + ⋅ − + − = π , 
 
where (Li + Ni - Ei  - Di) represent the net debtor position of the bank in the inter-bank 
market.   The profit function of the representative bank can then be rewritten as follows:  
 
  ( ) i i i i i i
n
i i
d
i i
l
i i W L N D C RE N R r D r R L R r , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( − + − + − + − = π . 
 
In order to evaluate the sources of banks profit, we will consider costs and revenues 
separately.  With respect to productive efficiency, and given that we have data on 
management costs, we will estimate a cost function directly. 
 
With respect to revenues, denoted REVi, they can be written as:  
 
  () () ()
ld n
ii i i ii i i REV r R L R r D r R N RE =− +− +− + . 
 
Revenues, loans, deposits, equity and non-loan assets are observed and this equation can 
be directly estimated. The parameters provide estimates of the average margins that William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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banks have earned on loans, deposits and non-loan assets, and also an estimate of the 
inter-bank rate, or more generally the opportunity cost of banks’ own funds. 
 
If the returns on non-loan assets and the inter-bank rate can be seen as exogenous for the 
banks, the rates that they charge on loans and deposits determine the respective margins 
or “prices”. The question then arises whether the variance of margins across banks and 
over time can be further exploited. Both the price charged by a bank at particular point in 
time and the quantity that it sells (either loans or deposits) are jointly determined as a 
result of the interaction between each firm’s supply curve and the demand that they face. 
Observed prices and quantities should be seen as an equilibrium outcome of oligopolistic 
competition among banks3. These equilibrium prices and quantities can also be expressed 
in terms of exogenous parameters (like the number of banks and the demand and cost 
parameters).    
 
The estimated coefficients in front of loans and deposits can therefore be seen as an 
equilibrium price, and the structure of these equilibrium prices across banks and over 
time can be further explored. In particular, the effects of exogenous variables on the 
equilibrium can be directly estimated, by specifying an equilibrium price function. In 
what follows, we will thus specify a model of oligopolistic competition among banks and 
derive equilibrium prices as a function of the underlying parameters. That is, we will 
explicitly derive equilibrium prices in the context of a structural model, obtain a reduced 
form for individual equilibrium prices and estimate the parameters of this reduced form.    
 
It is worth emphasising that this estimation does not allow for a direct identification of 
market power (or the estimation of supply functions). This requires the estimation of a 
structural model where demand and supply functions are jointly estimated, using 
observed prices and quantities (see, for instance, Bresnahan (1989) for an exposition of 
this approach and Ribon and Yosha (1999) or Neven and Röller (1999) for applications to 
banking). Nevertheless, the structure of equilibrium prices (and their decomposition into 
costs and margins) may give some indirect insight into the existence of market power as 
                                                           
3 For a model emphasizing the importance of market power in transition banking, see Hainz (2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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well as the influence of corporate control4.    
 
Consider the loan market (the analysis can be applied mutatis mutandis to the deposit 
market).  Assume that banks take the inter-bank market as given and that they define their 
loan policy independently of their strategy with respect to deposits.  This will hold if the 
cost function is separable in the two outputs. Assume that marginal management costs are 
constant (linear marginal cost could also be accommodated without difficulty). The profit 
function of bank i in the loan market is then given by:  
 
  () i i i i L c P − = π , 
 
where   
  
  R r P
l
i i − ≡ . 
 
Assume further that each bank faces an inverse demand function of the type:  
 
  i i i i L L a P − − − = λ  
 
where L-i denotes the total volume of loans sold by all other banks (in the same country 
and time period) and where λ < 1.   This demand specification (adapted from Shubik and 
Levitan (1980)) allows for product differentiation; banks may be able to differentiate 
their product in such a way that their demand curve is shifted out (the intercept ai 
increases).  In addition, this specification allows for reduced substitution between a 
bank’s products and those of competitors (λ falls). Such reduced substitution can be 
associated with product differentiation or market segmentation (induced for instance by a 
lack of competition). The characteristics of bank’s products that determine such 
differentiation are not observed.  
 
                                                           
4 This approach is thus semi-structural and in this respect is similar to that of Panzar-Ross which has often William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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Faced with this demand specification, each bank will maximise profit by solving the 
following first order condition: 
 
0 2 = − − − − i c L L a i i i λ . 
 
Summing up the first-order conditions for all banks yields 
 
() ( ) 0 1 2 = − − − − ∑ L n L c a
i
i i λ , 
 
where L denotes total loans provided by a banking system in a country. The volume of 
total loans in equilibrium is then given by  
 
() ( ) [] 1 2
* − + 





− = ∑ n c a L
i
i i λ . 
 
Combining this expression with the first order condition for each bank yields the 
equilibrium market share (
*
i MS ) and price (
*
i P ): 
 
() [] () ()() []






− − + 





− − − = ∑ λ λ λ 1 2 2 1
* n c a c a MS
i
i i i i i , and 
 
() [] () [] () ( ) [] () []






− − 





− − − − − + = ∑ 2 1 2 2 2
*
i i
i
i i i i i c a n c a c a P λ λ λ . 
 
The equilibrium loan market can then be expressed in terms of market share. From this 
expression it is possible to show that the derivative of the ith bank’s equilibrium loan 
margin with respect to its share of the loan market is:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
been applied to the banking industry (see De Bandt and Davis (2000) for  a recent example).      William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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() ( ) () ()()
 



 















− + + − − + − = ∂ ∂ ∑ ∑
i
i i i i i
i
i i i i c a n a c c c a MS M λ λ λ 2 2 1
* * . 
 
It is straightforward to show that this expression is positive for all values of the 
parameters for which market shares are positive. Therefore, an increased share of the loan 
market translates into a higher lending price or margin. More generally, equilibrium 
margins will be a function of market shares, of the parameters of demand and firm 
specific characteristics. Of particular interest will the sensitivity of prices to market 
shares. Taking the derivative of the last expression with respect to λ, it is easy to check 
that the sensitivity of prices to market shares is inversely related to λ and directly to a 
high level of overall demand (for a given number of firms). In other words, if we observe 
that prices are sensitive to market shares, it will be a symptom of high market 
segmentation and/or insufficient entry. Of course, the high level of segmentation could be 
associated with genuine product differentiation but this is less likely in the context of 
transition economies. 
 
 
3.1.  Empirical implementation  
 
For the cost function, we use a standard translog function (without second-order terms, 
none of which have proved at all significant in our preliminary estimations, and which 
add seriously to problems of multicollinearity).  The cost of firm i in country k at time t is 
specified as follows: 
 
+ + + + + + =∑ ikt
c
kt
c
kt
c
ikt
c
ikt
c
j
j
c
j ikt PRIVATE r W D L CD C ϕ φ δ χ β α ln ln ln ln ln  
  c
ikt c kt c kt c ikt c T INFLA GROWTH FOREIGN ε µ κ η γ + + + + , 
 
where we introduce country fixed effects ( j CD  refer to country dummy variables), wages 
( kt W ) and the real interest rate ( kt r ) as factor prices and a time trend (T) in order to trace William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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out potential productivity improvements in efficiency over time. We introduce bank 
characteristics to identify whether particular forms of corporate control are more 
effective. They include dummy variables to identify privatised banks ( ikt PRIVATE ) and 
new entrants ( ikt DENOVO ) and to indicate the presence of majority foreign ownership 
( ikt FOREIGN ). We introduce the three firm concentration index ( kt CR3 ) as a proxy for 
the number of banks in a country’s banking system, to capture the possibility that market 
power is translated into high costs (through the “quiet life” – see Ng & Seabright, 2001). 
We also introduce a number of variables that characterise the economic environments in 
which banks operate. They include the real rate of growth ( kt GROWTH ) and the rate of 
inflation ( kt INFLA ). 
 
In the empirical implementation of revenue equation, we assume that banks face 
exogenous prices for investments in non-loan assets but compete for both deposits and 
loans.  Following the above derivation, we write individual equilibrium prices as a 
function of market shares, parameters of demand and firm characteristics.  More 
precisely, the equilibrium price of bank i in the loan market l in country k at time t is 
expressed as:  
 
+ + + + =∑
kt l kt l kt l
j
j l
j
l
ikt CR INFLA GROWTH CD P 3 φ χ β α  
  ( )
l
ikt
l
ikt
l l
ikt
l
ikt
l
ikt
l l MS MS FOREIGN DENOVO PRIVATE ε λ κ η γ ϕ + + + + +
2
. 
 
That is, we allow for country fixed effects (where  j CD  are country dummy variables) 
and use real GDP growth ( kt GROWTH ), inflation ( kt INFLA ) and variables that shift 
demand.    As bank characteristics, we include (as in the cost equation) dummies to 
identify privatised banks ( ikt PRIVATE ) and new entrants ( ikt DENOVO ) and to indicate 
the presence of majority foreign ownership ( ikt FOREIGN ). The same specification is 
used for the equilibrium prices in the deposit market (simply substitute the superscript d). 
The error term is assumed to have the usual properties. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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The equation that we estimate is therefore written as:  
 
() () ikt ikt ikt ikt
d
ikt ikt
l
ikt ikt E N D P L P R ε ρ θ + + + + = . .,  
 
where θ and ρ can be interpreted respectively as the (exogenous) return that banks can 
obtain on non-loan assets and the inter-bank rate. Given that we introduce disturbances 
on both price equations, the overall error term can be written as: 
 
ikt ikt
d
ikt ikt
l
ikt D L ε ε ε + + . 
 
To account for the induced heteroscedasticity, we estimate this equation with GLS, and 
because of the dependence of the presence of an error term in the coefficient on loans and 
that on deposits, we instrument both loans and deposits using their own lagged values (a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates this is indeed appropriate in most of the estimations 
we report below). Similar considerations lead us to instrument market shares, since these 
are themselves measured by revenues.  
 
All our value data are expressed in real US dollars. With respect to bank revenues, we 
also consider the effect of inflation on bank equity (which is not protected against 
inflation). Inflation adjusted bank revenues are therefore computed as real revenues less 
the erosion of bank equity. The latter is measured as the equity base in the previous year 
multiplied by the reciprocal of one plus the current inflation rate.    
 
We estimate the cost and revenue equations while allowing for bank specific effects.  We 
estimate both fixed and random effects, but report only the random effects, since both the 
Haussman and Breusch-Pagan tests overwhelmingly reject the fixed-effects model in all 
specifications in favour of random effects. For the revenue equation estimates, where we 
instrument for loans and deposits, we use Baltagi’s (1981) error-components 2-stage least 
squares (EC2SLS) estimator (see Baltagi, 1995, chapter 7).  
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We also estimate both equations separately for the entire samples and for two sub-
samples, which comprise respectively high and low reform countries.   These sub-
samples are determined from an indicator of banking reform which provides a ranking of 
progress in liberalisation and institutional reform of the banking sector, on a scale of 1 to 
4+. A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist banking system apart from the 
separation of the central bank and commercial banks, while a score of 2 means that a 
country has established internal currency convertibility and has liberalised significantly 
both interest rates and credit allocation. A score of 3 means that a country has achieved 
substantial progress in developing the capacity for effective prudential regulation and 
supervision, including procedures for the resolution of bank insolvencies, and in 
establishing hardened budget constraints on banks by eliminating preferential access to 
concessionary refinancing from the central bank. A score of 4+ represents a level of 
reform that approximates the institutional standards and norms of an industrialised 
market economy, as represented, for example, by the Basle Committee’s Core Principles 
on Effective Banking Supervision and Regulation. The scoring assessments are by EBRD 
country economists (see EBRD (2000), Chapter 2).  
 
We partition the panel data set using the EBRD transition indicators because in theory the 
behaviour and performance of banks is dependent on the nature of policies and 
institutions (see Lucas, 1976) and because there is significant empirical evidence from 
transition banking to this effect (see Fries and Taci, 2002). Since the EBRD transition 
indicators are ordinal measures of changes in policies and institutions that affect banking, 
we should in principle interact each value of the indicators separately with each of the 
explanatory variables. However, to obtain a more parsimonious expression, we simply 
partition the data set into two sub-samples (relatively high and low reform states) using 
the indicators and then examine whether bank behaviour and performance differs 
between the two sub-samples. 
 
3.2 Results   
 
Table 1 reports cost function estimates for the whole sample as well as the high and low 
reform sub-samples.    Table 2 reports revenue function estimates for the high and low William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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reform sub-samples. Let us first summarise the results for the high reform sub-sample. 
With respect to costs, we first observe that banks operate with increasing returns, with an 
elasticity of costs with respect to output well below unity. The very low elasticity of costs 
with respect to real wages (0.097) suggests that banks facing higher wages over time 
have been able been able to substitute other factors for labour. This suggests that new, 
labour-saving technologies have spread easily in transition economies. Next, we find 
evidence that rents in the loan market may lead to productive inefficiency, with costs 
rising by 1.8 % for each percentage point increase in market share. New entrant banks 
have strikingly lower costs than others, though privatisation per se has no significant 
effect. Costs are also strongly negatively correlated with overall GDP growth. 
 
As far as revenues are concerned, banks have been earning comfortable margins over 
their marginal cost of funds in the loan market, but margins are even negative (though 
insignificantly so) in the deposit market. Margins actually decrease with market share5, 
which corroborates the evidence from the cost function to suggest that market power 
makes for poor management rather than high profits (overall market concentration is 
insignificant in these equations and has been omitted from the reported specifications). 
Overall returns on equity are very poor (over 20% negative in real terms). Alternative 
corporate control structures do not seem to affect margins, with the exception of banks 
with majority foreign ownership, which have slightly lower margins (by less than a 
percentage point). Real deposit margins are also positively affected by inflation, whereas 
real loan margins are negatively affected. Such effects of inflation are commonly 
observed for banks in the EU (see for instance, Gual and Neven (1993)) and are usually 
attributed to the presence of transactions costs and hysteresis. Finally, revenues show a 
secular tendency to rise over time though so, unfortunately, do costs. 
 
The situation in the low reform countries is rather different, particularly on the revenue 
side. As far as costs are concerned, new entrants do not have significantly lower costs, 
and the estimated lower costs of banks with majority foreign ownership are only weakly 
                                                           
5 High collinearity between deposit and loan market shares means we have not been able to distinguish 
between deposit and loan market power as such. We cite the measure that has the higher significance of the 
two on an equation-by-equation basis. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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significant at conventional levels. Once again costs are negatively correlated with 
macroeconomic growth. However, the revenue side shows a strikingly different pattern 
from the high reform countries. There are large negative margins on loans6 (nearly 10%) 
and very large margins on deposits.  Margins are once again negatively affected by 
market share. It is striking that de novo and privatised banks obtain lower returns (by 
around 5 percentage points), and also those with a foreign majority stake, by an even 
wider margin. This is consistent with the view that incumbency is playing a major role, 
presumably through the initial stock of deposits. Returns on equity are insignificantly 
different from zero. This suggests that banks in low reform countries have been 
benefiting from seignorage revenue on deposits, and then using these rents to sustain their 
portfolios of weak loans. 
 
Finally, in Table 3 we investigate the robustness of these findings (and particularly the 
difference between the high and low reform groups), by reporting estimates on a pooled 
sample. The first equation uses slope dummies to test the hypothesis that margins on 
deposits and loans, as well as returns to equity, are significantly different in the two sub-
samples. An F-test comfortably rejects the hypothesis of equality of coefficients in all 
cases, and the results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 2. The second 
equation interacts the equity and deposit variables directly with the measure of progress 
in banking reform that was used to construct the sub-samples, as well as interacting the 
loan variable with the measure of progress in enterprise reform. Returns on loans increase 
very significantly with progress in enterprise reform, as one might expect given that the 
majority of loans are those to enterprises7. Likewise, returns on deposits fall with 
progress in banking reform, which makes sense given that banking reform is likely to 
increase the degree of competition in the banking system and reduce the extent to which 
depositors are captive to the banks. 
 
                                                           
6 The returns on loans that is estimated within groups may be larger than the estimate across groups. This is 
actually confirmed by the estimates of a fixed effect model (not reported).  It would therefore appear that 
banks which have grown their loan portfolios have obtained higher (and possibly positive) returns than 
those suggested by the random effects estimates. 
7 It is intuitive that it should be enterprise reform that affects loan margins more than banking reform per 
se, but we also tested the interaction with banking reform, which is insignificant. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the performance and profitability of 515 banks in 16 transition 
economies for the years 1994 – 99 based on their public financial accounts. We first 
examine lending behaviour and probability distribution of bank profitability to identify 
whether these banks exhibit behaviour and performance associated with excessive risk-
taking. Evidence of excessive risk taking would point the possibility that banks are 
trading off greater short-term accounting profits at the expense of higher risks, the costs 
of which may not be fully reflected in banks’ accounts. While we do not find evidence of 
excessive risk taking where there is significant progress in banking and related enterprise 
reforms, there may be a minority of poorly capitalised banks that do take excessive risks, 
particularly where progress in reform is less advanced.   
 
In the estimated cost and revenue functions of banks, we also find that banks' 
performance differs significantly depending on the reform environment, as well as the 
competitive conditions, in which they operate. Banks with high market shares have 
higher costs and achieve lower margins on deposits. Where there has been significant 
progress in banking and related enterprise reforms, banks are making comfortable 
margins on loans and appear to be offering competitive margins on deposits, though they 
are still achieving overall negative returns on equity.  By contrast, when substantial 
reforms have not been undertaken, banks have been sustaining high negative returns on 
loans, largely at the expense of depositors; in effect they have been able to appropriate 
much of the tax that inflation levies on nominal deposits, and have been using this 
revenue to prop up their weak loan portfolios.  
 
  The outlook is not entirely bleak. Table 4 indicates that net interest margins, 
which are an indicator (albeit an imperfect one) of the effective cost of intermediation to 
the users of the banking system, have been falling over time, as well as being 
systematically lower in the high reform countries. The data do not allow us to tell to what 
extent these falling margins represent genuine reductions in anticipated margins as 
opposed to an unintended inability to service outstanding loans. Nevertheless, the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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evidence from the regressions suggests that loan management in high reform countries 
has been reasonable while that in low reform countries has been improving, albeit from a 
very poor base. But it is indisputable that banking systems in transition economies have 
some way to go before they can assure an efficient, flexible and affordable financial 
intermediation service to their users. Our results indicate that an appropriate policy and 
regulatory framework may be a necessary condition for significant progress to be made. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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Table 1: Panel estimations of cost function, bank random 
effects 
         
                    
  Pooled sample
Observations=1725
Banks=478
Rsq=0.73
  High reform sample 
Observations=833 
Banks=202 
Rsq=0.74 
  Low reform sample
Observations=892
Banks=276
Rsq=0.76
                    
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Err. P-value Coefficient Std. Err. P-value    Coefficient Std. Err. P-value
        
Log (loans + deposits)  0.643  0.018  60.7% 0.600 0.023 0.0%    0.750 0.028 0.0%
Log wage  -0.008  0.030  6.6% 0.097 0.044 2.8%    0.038 0.066 56.2%
Loan market share  0.016  0.004  0.7% 0.018 0.005 0.0%    0.010 0.007 18.3%
3-firm concentration 
ratio 
0.002 0.001 0.1% 0.000 0.002 96.4%    0.003 0.002 13.8%
New entrant  -0.201  0.084  36.5% -0.384 0.098 0.0%    -0.071 0.133 59.3%
Privatised 0.080  0.076  6.9% -0.015 0.086 86.5%    0.073 0.137 59.3%
Foreign majority stake  -0.110  0.067  24.2% 0.037 0.074 61.8%    -0.225 0.125 7.2%
Log output growth  -2.960  0.517  397.4
%
-4.020 0.878 0.0%   -2.166 0.849 1.1%
Log inflation  -0.112  0.099  30.6% 0.182 0.331 58.3%    -0.096 0.140 49.0%
Log real interest rate  0.174  0.083  1.2% 0.238 0.254 34.9%    0.103 0.116 37.6%
Time 0.012  0.011  0.9% 0.010 0.015 49.4%    0.026 0.024 28.7%
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Table 2: Panel estimations of revenue function, bank random effects, 
split sample 
   High reform sample
Observations=680
Banks=201
Rsq=0.94
Low reform sample
Observations=702
Banks=274
Rsq=0.93
      
Variable    Coefficient Std. Err. P-value Coefficient Std. Err.  P-value
      
Equity   -0.207 0.042 0.0% -0.045  0.064  47.3%
Deposits   -0.028 0.019 14.7% 0.468  0.037  0.0%
Loans   0.191 0.022 0.0% -0.092  0.028  0.1%
Non-loan assets    0.117 0.015 0.0% 0.022  0.040  58.7%
      
Deposit market share    -0.003 0.000 0.0%    
Loan market share    -0.004  0.001  0.5%
New entrant    -0.001 0.007 85.4% -0.057  0.020  0.5%
Privatised   0.006 0.003 7.2% -0.057  0.012  0.0%
Foreign majority stake    -0.009 0.004 0.9% -0.128  0.034  0.0%
Inflation (deposits)    0.593 0.095 0.0%    
Inflation (loans)    -0.308 0.181 8.8%    
Log real interest rate    -0.031 0.037 40.5% 0.008  0.027  77.4%
Log output growth    0.030 0.062 62.9% -0.118  0.176  50.4%
Year   0.005 0.001 0.0% -0.052  0.005  0.0%
      
   χ-sq p-value χ-sq   p-value
D-W-H test deposits    15.03 0.00 0.63    0.43
D-W-H test loans    105.96 0.00 7.29    0.01
D-W-H test mkt share    26.22 0.00 29.30    0.00William Davidson Institute Working Paper 505 
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Table 3: Panel estimations of revenue function, bank random 
effects, pooled sample 
  Slope Dummies
Observations=1382
Banks=475
Rsq=0.91
  Transition Interactions
Observations=684
Banks=202
Rsq=0.94
    
Variable  Coefficient Std. Err. P-value   Coefficient Std. Err.  P-value
  
Equity (high reform)  -0.164 0.061 0.7%  
Equity (low reform)  -0.001 0.042 99.0%  
Equity 0.953 0.254  0.0%
Equity*Bank Reform  -0.252 0.084  0.3%
Deposits (high reform)  0.056 0.022 1.2%  
Deposits (low reform)  0.397 0.021 0.0%  
Deposits 1.847 0.086  0.0%
Deposits*Bank Reform  -0.484 0.024  0.0%
Loans (high reform)  0.137 0.017 0.0%  
Loans (low reform)  -0.082 0.021 0.0%  
Loans -0.662 0.110  0.0%
Loans*Enterprise 
Reform 
0.253 0.039 0.0%
Non-loan assets   0.089 0.020 0.0% 0.021 0.018  22.8%
Determinants of margins:   
  
Loan market share  -0.001 0.000 0.1% -0.004 0.000  0.0%
New entrant  -0.020 0.010 4.1% -0.044 0.012  0.0%
Privatised -0.001 0.004 75.2% -0.014 0.004  0.2%
Foreign majority stake  0.002 0.005 59.3% -0.002 0.005  70.9%
Log real interest rate  0.039 0.018 2.6% 0.091 0.018  0.0%
Log output growth  -0.226 0.068 0.1% -0.762 0.056  0.0%
Inflation -0.179 0.035  0.0%
Year -0.004 0.001 0.0%  
  
  χ-sq p-val χ-sq  p-value
D-W-H test deposits   5.47
(hi ref)
0.02 21.68  0.00
 36.61
 (lo ref)
0.00  
D-W-H test loans   3.55
(hi ref)
0.06 140.31  0.00
  70.17
(lo ref)
0.00  
D-W-H test mkt share  0.01 0.91 10.58  0.00
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Table 4: Net Interest Margins, % of assets, by initial reform environment and 
year 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
Low 
reform 
5.7% 6.3% 8.7% 5.3% 4.4% 4.0% 6.0% 
High 
reform 
4.4% 4.3% 3.9% 3.7% 3.7% 3.5% 3.9% 
Average  4.8% 5.1% 5.8% 4.3% 3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 
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